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Abstract
With Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems being deeply rooted in
the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure, it is necessary for combat models to capture C4ISR
effects in order to properly assess military worth. Unlike many DoD legacy combat
models, the agent based model System Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation (SEAS)
is identified as having C4ISR analysis capabilities. In lieu of requirements for all new
DoD C4ISR weapon systems to be placed within a DoD Architectural Framework
(DoDAF), investigation of means to export data from the Framework to the combat
model SEAS began. Through operational, system, and technical views, the DoDAF
provides a consistent format for new weapon systems to be compared and evaluated.
Little research has been conducted to show how to create an executable model of
an actual DoD weapon system described by the DoDAF. In collaboration with Systems Engineering masters student Captain Andrew Zinn, this research identified the
Aerospace Operation Center (AOC) weapon system architecture, provided by the
MITRE Corp., as suitable for translation into SEAS. The collaborative efforts lead
to the identification and translation of architectural data products to represent the
Time Critical Targeting (TCT) activities of the AOC. A comparison of the AOC
weapon system employing these TCT activities with an AOC without TCT capabilities is accomplished within a Kosovo-like engagement (provided by Space and
Missile Center Transformations Directorate). Results show statistically significant
differences in measures of effectiveness (MOEs) chosen to compare the systems. The
comparison also identified the importance of data products not available in this incomplete architecture and makes recommendations for SEAS to be more receptive
to DoDAF data products.
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AGENT BASED SIMULATION
SEAS EVALUATION OF DODAF ARCHITECTURE

1. Introduction
1.1

Background
Air power theory suggests that the effects of quick strikes and global reach

propagate throughout an opponent’s military. The propagation is expected to yield
catastrophic output or strategic effects [3]. All U.S. military forces expect to take
advantage of similar effects by attacking tactical, operational, and strategic targets in
concert. This theory rests largely upon an observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA)
model of warfare. Unfortunately, many current war gaming, training, and analysis
simulations’ models of war are built upon ”Cold War” doctrine which do not support
current network centric and asymmetric warfare. The OODA model of warfare
places significant stock in the contribution of Command, Control, Communication,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).
Operational studies have shown agent based simulation utilizing this OODA
model of war as a competent method to gain insight to the military value of C4ISR
systems. The gain being the ability to match and evaluate the performance of a
system with its concept of operation in a multitude of scenarios. Slowly all services
are beginning to integrate these models in to their respective repertoire of simulation
models. The Air Force standard analysis toolkit (AFSAT) is an Air Force approved
collection of models and simulations (M&S) tools which are to support acquisitions
and operational decisionmaking. Included in the AFSAT, the only agent based
simulation, is the combat model System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS).
SEAS was designed by the Air Force Space and Missile Center (SMC) to specifically
1-1

address the aforementioned OODA loop model of war and the functional contribution
of C4ISR systems [31].
In an effort to improve the process of acquiring and implementing these C4ISR
systems, the DoD requires the use of systems architectures. This was in response to
lessons learned during the Gulf War which eventually led to a congressional mandate
in the form of the Clinger-Cohen Act [32]. To improve and standardize these architectures, the DoD has created an Architectural Framework (know as the DoDAF
for DoD Architectural Framework). The DoDAF divides the description into three
views: operational, system, and technical. These views provide a broad overview of
the system, and also views yielding specific interconnections supporting warfighting
functions. Each view consists of several architectural ”products” that are named according to their view (i.e. OV-1, SV-4, etc.). The Air Force Chief Architect’s office
has advocated several possible uses for these architectures, one of which is, ”Military
Worth Analysis” using M&S (AF-CIO/A at https://cao.hanscom.af.mil/af-cio.htm).

1.2

Research Problem
The current guidance on the use of system architectures is clear, but unproven

[32]. Translating data from system architecture views in order to evaluate the dynamic effects of a C4ISR system would be of great assistance in an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA). As mentioned SEAS has been built for and is capable of capturing the effects of the proposed system in a combat scenario. Once, a specific instance
of a C4ISR system represented in DODAF is translated then general algorithms may
be able to be created affording evaluation of any architecture while still early in the
acquisition cycle.
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1.3

Research Objective
The objective of this research is to investigate the means of exporting data

from operation, system, and technical architecture products of the DODAF to the
agent-based combat model SEAS. This is to be accomplished such that the combat
model captures proper measures of effectiveness to evaluate the represented systems’
worth. Also, to provide consistent translation of performance and concept of operations (ConOps) parameter definitions. A secondary objective is to comment on the
maturity of the architecture evaluation process using dynamic simulation, and what
needs to be done to improve the process.

1.4

Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 is divided into 4 main sections. The first section provides background

on traditional combat M&S used in the DoD. The second section describes agent
based simulation and the model of war they are built upon. Also, an overview of the
combat model SEAS is given. A third section provides background on the structure
and intent of C4ISR architectures. Finally, a fourth section reviews current research
in the dynamic modeling of architectures. Chapter 3 first provides an overview
of the architectural products used in this study. Then we give a description of the
scenario the system is evaluated in. Next, translations of communications, activities,
and general attributes from the architectural products to SEAS is given. Finally,
verification, validation, and analysis issues are discussed. Chapter 4 provides the
development of the analysis and numerical results of measures of effectiveness. Lastly,
a summary of the military utility analysis substantiating the use of architectures
represented in DoDAF as plausible source documentation for M & S is presented.
Also, limitations on the study due to the maturity of the architecture and the combat
model are given in Chapter 5.
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2. Literature Review
2.1

Introduction
This research is a collaborative effort investigating the means of exporting

data from architectural products based on the Department of Defense Architectural
Framework (DoDAF) to an agent-based combat model (ABCM). The ABCM chosen
for this role is the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS). This transition
of data allows Military Utility Analysis (MUA) of the weapon system depicted in
the architecture.
Current Department of Defense (DoD) Modeling and Simulation practices will
be reviewed with focus on how SEAS provides effective MUA analysis for C4ISR
effects of a weapon system. Also, this literature review develops the concept of the
DoDAF and its implementation in the recently revised acquisition process. Finally,
relevant research involving dynamic modeling of architectures is presented.

2.2

DoD Combat Modeling & Simulation
The (DoD) uses a vast number of models with the majority focused on some

aspect of combat. According to the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO)
current uses of combat models include training, analysis and acquisition. In this
review focus is placed on exploring the proper “level” and type of combat model to be
used in analysis and acquisition. First, a discussion of major underlying assumptions
used in many combat models will be given. Next, the “levels” of combat models used
by the DoD will be discussed. Finally, in efforts to lay foundation for ABCM treating
war as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is visited.
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2.2.1

Lanchester
Over the course of history combat models have been built upon the given rules

of warfare of the time. Widely used equations to drive modern warfare models can
be associated with Frederick William Lanchester. Lanchester, a British engineer
and inventor assumed two scenarios, single combat (hand-to-hand) and theater campaigns (armies) [14]. The first scenario involves a simple linear relationship between
the number of troops and the loss rate. The second scenario involves a proportional
relationship between loss rate and number of enemy firers. Thus, these two models
have been coined Lanchester’s linear and square laws.
The basic approach is to write a differential equation that equates the loss rate
of two homogeneous forces via two factors; (1) the size or number of opposing troops
and (2) the effectiveness of the killing power of each troop.
The generic Lanchester Equations of modern warfare “aimed fire” are stated
below.
dX
= −aY
dt
dY
= −bX
dt
Where:
X = number of blue forces
Y = number of red forces
a= effective firing rate of red
b = effective firing rate of blue
Demonstrating the principle of concentration of force was the original intent
of the above coefficients (a,b). These Lanchester equations can answer questions in
homogeneous combat like determining the number of survivors, how long will the
battle last, and who won the fight. Rarely will combat ever consist of homogenous
(individual elements of the forces have identical characteristics)forces. A simple
2-2

example is the introduction of tanks into a ground battle. The tank will have a
greater killing power then the troops it is fighting with. Refinements to address this
attrition problem and others have been developed.
Not all deficiencies with combat models lie within the attrition processes. Other
issues include range dependency, replacement of forces, C4ISR, and little or no portrayal of logistical aspects. These issues coupled with attrition are necessary to
more accurately portray combat. Significant enrichments and enhancements have
been made to accommodate these and other unmentioned shortcomings. For over
eighty years Lanchester equations have remained a well used tool in the evaluation
of combat. However, as doctrine, tactics, and politics change constant revision will
be needed to this equation based model of combat.
The Lanchester equations can be considered the model of war, and the evaluation of this model over various time steps yields answers we are searching for. In
fact, the DoD defines simulation as a method for implementing a model over time
or as a technique for testing, analysis, or training in which real-world systems are
used, or where real-world and conceptual systems are reproduced by a model [9].
Lanchester equation models provide some structure, components, and interactions
of the war, and simulation evaluates the war over time.
Computer simulations may use Lanchester expressions “locally” (i.e., for attrition estimates within a given time interval), but the coefficients of those equations
change from time step to time step as conditions of terrain, defender preparations,
and many other factors change. Furthermore, good computer simulations recognize
that the losing side may choose to break off battle rather than be annihilated [6].
Unfortunately, even when considering the enrichments of Lanchester equations they
will not provide feedback to issues like when the losing side will decide to “break”
off the battle. To evaluate this break some human intevention of the simulation is
necessary.
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However, Lanchester equations integrate well with the “piston driven” warfare
we executed in World Wars I and II and planned on fighting against Warsaw Pact
forces. For many years we expected our battles to be fought out exclusively on lines
(Forward Edge of the Battle Area - FEBA) with Red forces massed on one side and
Blue on the other. Troops and equipment are modeled to engage along FEBA, and
never drift too far horizontally. The parallel strips of forces, pistons, are assessed for
size, and firepower so that attrition can be calculated. This structured war allowed
Lanchester equations to predict attrition quite nicely.

2.2.2

Aggregation
Within each piston there may be many individual troops and a large amount of

equipment. When modeled in this manner, troops and equipment are called entities
which may have associated values (attributes). When large scale scenarios are to be
evaluated it is common to lump similar entities together. This lumping is referred
to as aggregation. Aggregation is defined by DoD 5000.59-M as “the ability to
group entities while preserving the effects of entity behavior and interaction while
grouped” [10]. Aggregation is not limited to lumping soldiers into a unit, but also
resources may be aggregated to the unit, or even the brigade level. This may be
done for desired output measures, or the shear number of entities may not be able
to be computed in a reasonable amount of time.
Capturing output for all individual force interactions on the battlefield may not
be possible or even the intent of a given model. DoDs combat model hierarchy(Figure
2.1) categorizes combat models based on resolution and aggregation. Resolution is
defined as: “the degree of detail and precision used in the representation of real world
aspects in a model or simulation” [9]. A high resolution combat model (engineering
level) includes the physics of an engagement between a small number of platforms.
These models typically yield some Measure of Performance(MOP) of a system versus
a threat (e.g. the ability of a stealth fighter to pass over enemy radar without
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Figure 2.1

Combat Model Hierarchy

detection). Aggregate, low-resolution combat models(campaign level) are needed in
cases where the historical data available is of aggregated nature. Also, command
and control (C2) decisions often require information at an aggregate level [15].
Aggregation is intended to preserve the effects of entity behavior and interaction while grouped, but little theory or science is present in most approaches that
have been taken to aggregation in combat modeling [15]. Conclusions of a companion paper of Hillestad on theoretical issues of aggregation state that “aggregation
and disaggregation cannot be done arbitrarily and that fairly strong requirements
are necessary to obtain consistent high- and low-resolution models” [16]. Disaggregation means the evaluation of the number of each entity type attrited when the
aggregate force has been reduced. Typically, it is of interest to preserve effects or
be consistent from the high- to low-resolution models. According to Caldwell, “The
high-resolution model has some face validity because its detailed process structures
follow real actions and events closely. Thus, being consistent with a high-resolution
model would be an advantage for an aggregated simulation” [4].
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2.2.3

Problems with Aggregation
Despite calibration and other techniques to maintain consistency, aggregated

models used by the DoD lose some information. Hartman addresses the following
consequences of aggregation. Aggregating individual combatants into groups result
in lost information of the individuals actions. What each agent is doing at any given
time is not known. Also, loss of information about event sequences occurs from
not keeping track of individual entity actions [14]. Of course, action is taken to
compensate for this information loss. Typically, this is done by modeling combat
processes using average behavior rather than individual behavior. Overall, it is
critical to use aggregation techniques that do not directly affect the output measures
that are to be characterized by the simulation. This means if averaging behavior
directly affects an output measure of the simulation some other method needs to be
employed.

2.2.4

C4ISR Effects
Information Superiority (IS) has been identified as a key element of U.S. doc-

trine. Emphasis is placed on generating and protecting the flow of information. Advanced C4ISR systems are intended to provide IS and deny the enemy this capability.
IS is seen as an enabler for improved, rapid, and smart command decisionmaking or
so-called Decision Superiority [12].
The flow of information for decision making is often looked at as a BOYD
(Col. John Boyd, USAF (Ret)) OODA loop. The OODA (Observe Orient Decide
Act) loop describes the thought process of a single warrior, a pilot, or a commander.
Each member observes his surroundings through collected information via sight,
sensors, advisors, etc. He then orientates himself based on this information. Next,
some decision of action to be taken is reached. Finally, action is taken to attack,
maneuver, or evade the enemy. It is traditional wisdom that the advantage goes
to he who processes his OODA loop faster than the enemy. This can be confirmed
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by computer simulation studies or real life action that Col Boyd observed, such as
when U.S. pilots out maneuvered faster Russian Migs, in turn having the advantage
of taking the next action before the enemy. He created the OODA loop from this
experience, and it has been applied across military and business processes.
The contributions of C4ISR systems should be evaluated not just at the technical level (e.g., how quickly and accurately systems collect and transmit information), but also at a higher level that can be related to emerging joint doctrine and
operational-level command decision-making [12]. In other words it is important to
determine how the information supplied by C4ISR systems helps to achieve operational advantages that in turn result from dynamic command decision making. This
typically can not be done via traditional DoD combat simulations. Ilachinski [18]
states that Lanchester attrition calculations do not account for spatial variation of
forces or advantage of maneuver. C4ISR effects are also casualties of aggregation as
seen in studies by RAND, Space and Missile Center (SMC), and other DoD agencies.
Also, the need for new measures and metrics that incorporate the effectiveness of
C4ISR systems, procedures, and equipment and their effect on combat outcome is
emphasized in work by Perry [30]. Integration of DoD M&S is called upon as one
of the key enablers to produce these metrics. Not to discount the need and utility
of equation based models but, a different model of war is needed to capture and
illuminate the effects of C4ISR described above.

2.3

Modeling War as a complex adaptive system
Enemies adapt and learn our behaviors, and in turn we do the same. As

per Air Force Basic Doctrine, war is considered “complex and chaotic” and “war is
not waged against an inanimate or static object, but against a living, calculating
enemy” [1]. This being conceded in our doctrine, capturing these behaviors of war
in combat models seems imperative.
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The doctrine conflicts with the rigid mathematical rules set in many of the
DoD combat models (e.g. Lanchester-Based models). Although stochastic and deterministic mathematical based models do have solid purposes they are too rigid to
capture “flexible and situational principles of war that are to be applied to tactical decisions” [29]. Modeling war as a Complex Adaptive System offers insight to
elements of war not captured by the traditional style of model, such as C4ISR effects.

2.3.1

Complex Adaptive Systems
A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is defined as a set of elements that are

interconnected so that changes in some elements, or their interrelations, produce
changes in other parts of the system. Also, the entire system demonstrates properties
and behaviors that are different from those of the individual parts [21]. An example
is attacking a Center of Gravity (COG) or a commanders OODA loop. This can be
considered a change in some element of the system in hope to change the behavior
of the whole system. If the entities in war can be characterized as a set of elements
that are interconnected such that the aforementioned results can be observed, we
are on the way to modeling war as a CAS.
Modeling a CAS follows a solid mathematical backing of complexity, and chaos.
A good development of this can be found in Ilachinski [19]. There are also other
defining points of a CAS including decentralized control, self-organization, and nonlinear interaction. Since warfare commonly demonstrates these qualities it has been
asserted that combat should be able to follow the same methodological course of
study as any other complex adaptive system [18].

2.3.2

Agent Based Modeling
Agent based modeling claims to allow adaptive decision making by entities.

This is accomplished by allowing individual entities to act autonomously, governed
by its own set of rules. ABM has been proposed for many situations involving
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a large number of heterogeneous individuals, such as vehicles and pedestrians in
traffic, people in crowds, artificial characters in computer games, agents in financial
markets, and humans and machines on battlefields [28].
Agent-based simulations are well suited for testing hypotheses about the origin
of observed emergent properties in a system. This can be done simply by experimenting with sets of initial conditions at the micro-level necessary to yield a set
of desired behaviors at the macro-level. On the other hand, they also provide a
powerful framework within which to integrate ostensibly “disjointed” theories from
various related disciplines. For example, while basic agent-agent interactions may
be described by simple physics and sociology, the internal decision-making capability of a single agent may be derived, in part, from an understanding of cognitive
psychology. This understanding forms the building block of most models of complex
adaptive nature [5].
Combat agent-based models offer an opportunity to analyze, the behavior and
interactions between the participating entities of war, where traditional models typically only analyze the performance of specific weapons or sensors. In other words,
we shift our attention from analyzing the performance of pieces of equipment to
how different modes of operation may alter the outcome of a particular combat or
peacekeeping operation, or how the C2 system utilizes information and acts upon
it [23].

2.3.3

Agent Based Models in the DoD
The DoD has recently incorporated ABM into its combat modeling library.

Evidence of ABM can be seen in studies conducted by all four major services.
The NAVY utilizes Agent Based simulation with the Naval Simulation System
(NSS). NSS is the primary model for supporting network centric Fleet Battle Exercises (http://www.metsci.com/ssd/nss.html). Network centric warfare enables a
shift from attrition-style warfare to a much faster and more effective warfighting style
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characterized by the new concepts of speed of command and self-synchronization [2].
NSS is capable of capturing the self-synchronization of warriors and the effects of
speed of command in combat due to its agent qualities and CAS model of war.
The Marine Corps relies on JIVES (Joint Integrated Visualization Environment
Simulation) for insight to such issues as urban conflict. Also, ISAAC (Irreducible
Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat) has been created in part by the Marine Corps
to evaluate how certain aspects of land combat can be viewed as emergent phenomena
resulting from the collective, nonlinear, decentralized interactions among notional
combatants [5].
As part of the Air Force Standard Analysis Tool Kit(AFSAT) SEAS is used
for a wide range of analysis. The Army has also taken advantage of SEAS in a study
to asses the value of Information Superiority for ground forces [12].

2.3.4

SEAS
SEAS is a stochastic, mission-level model designed for use in evaluation of

the military utility of airborne and space-based communications and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets [27].
As mentioned previously, aggregation of highly detailed system level simulations provide data for mission level models like SEAS. However, SEAS utilizes a
vertical aggregation method (reduction of the overall number of entities in the system) as to previously discussed horizontal aggregation where like entities are lumped
together. This method allows the preservation of the essential configuration of forces
in space and time that is critical in assessing the impact of ISR and information dominance on combat outcomes [17].
Each agent in SEAS runs a parallel execution thread with interactions adjudicated on a time tic by time tic basis. Time increments are one minute. In between
time steps a set of processes are carried out. Figure 2.2 shows the event processing
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First Time Increment

Debit Agent Resources

Process Sensor Sightings

Process Movement

Process Communication
Queues

Enforce Kills

Process Weapons

Enforce Movement

Enforce State Changes

Next Time Increment

Figure 2.2

SEAS Event Processing

logic with various types of information processed, changes made to the state of the
system, and then enforcement of individual agent actions. This process in SEAS is
based on the Boyd OODA loop.
Figure ?? highlights the hierarchical nature of a forces’ assets, and a high level
description of interactions between agents. Two types of agents in SEAS (unit and
platform) interact within an environment via its owned equipment. An example of
a unit in SEAS is an Aerospace Operations Center (AOC). This unit agent may
own other unit agents such as a Fighter Squadron. Within the unit, agent platform
agents such as a F-16 fighter reside. More detail of the interaction and execution
of agent actions is available at www.teamseas.com. Each platform agent may have
a simple rule set which take precedences over commands passed from a unit agent.
These rules and parallel execution allow SEAS to model combat with decentralized
control and autonomous agent action.
Studies have shown SEAS to be a competent platform to evaluate C4ISR effects. As mentioned previously, interest in capturing C4ISR effects has increased
due to weapon systems dependence on ISR assets to shorten the decision cycle to
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Figure 2.3

Diagram of Agents in SEAS

attack, maneuver, and exploit the enemy. If a new weapon system does not integrate
well into a force C4ISR structure, its potential effectiveness is greatly reduced. The
DoD has recognized this and called for an evaluation of any new weapons systems’
interoperability within the C4ISR structure it is expected to perform in.

2.4

Architectures
Acquisition of any new DoD weapon system includes an integrated C4ISR ar-

chitecture of that system. One of many definitions of an architecture is: “The structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing
their design and evolution over time” [25]. The intent of the C4ISR architectures is to
improve capabilities by quickly synthesising “go-to-war” requirements, aid efficient
engineering, and rapid employment of improved operational system capabilities.
DoD and other Federal Agencies have developed architecture frameworks to
provide rules and guidance for developing and presenting architecture descriptions
in a uniform and consistent manner; ensure that architecture descriptions can be
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understood, compared, and related; define numerous products (graphical, textual,
and tabular) to capture specific architectural descriptions [26].
A driving force for this wide usage of architectures in the DoD are the numerous
mandates and policies imposed on Defense Acquisitions and Information Technologies. A well developed evolution and policy of the current Architectural Framework,
Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF), to be used in DoD acquisitions can be found in Zinn [32]. In short these frameworks allow insight and
foresight into issues like interoperability of a new weapon system into the military
structure. Of course this requires integration into the C4ISR structure.
Information given from the architecture yields a static view of the systems
interoperability. The architecture of the system is integrated to show the operational
and system sides. This integration allows the DoDAF to provide a key element in the
engineering design of a system, mapping operational activities to system functions in
one architecture [32]. A brief overview of key components responsible for conveying
this information is given.
The All-Views (AV) product encompasses some aspects of the three views
discussed below. These are mainly high level executive summaries of the system
that contain the following information: product definition, purpose, and detailed
description. This discussion gives a brief overview of these products.
According to the DoDAF, the operational view (OV) is “a description of the
tasks and activities, operational elements, and information exchanges required to
accomplish DoD missions” [11]. There are seven products of the OV with the syntax
OV-1 through OV-7. The detail of each product is not discussed here. The Systems
View (SV) contains eleven products that describe the systems that support operations. These products are usually created in concert with or after the operational
views. The Technical View (TV) provides general technical guidance for the OV and
SV as well as technical and engineering standards for the SV. The diagram displays
the interdependency of the views as evident in system views supporting operational
2-13

activities. For more detail on the AV and the three views presented, reference Zinn
or the DoDAF Volume II.
It is of interest to “view” the dynamic behavior of a system for evaluation
purposes. Some of the products of the mentioned views give some description of
the dynamic behavior. In particular OV-6 products describe the dynamic behavior
of the system. According to the DoDAF: “The dynamic behavior referred to here
concerns the timing and sequencing of events that capture operational behavior of
a business process or mission thread for example” [8]. Some vehicle is needed to
take these products and put them into motion. Petri Nets have been identified as a
environment to create an executable model of these systems.

2.5

Dynamic Modeling of Architectures
In recognition of the static nature of architectures, there are several ongoing

efforts to dynamically model systems presented via architecture. The dynamic modeling is of interest to evaluate if all the gears in the system turn, and how the system
impacts the environment in which it is to be placed.

2.5.1

Petri Nets
Petri nets provide a modeling and simulation environment in which an exe-

cutable model can be created from an architecture [13]. To understand how Petri
nets can model dynamic behavior they first need to be defined. Next the petri models
abilities and utility can be discussed.
A Petri Net is defined as a bipartite directed graph. Figure 2.4 displays the
characteristic nature of the Petri net. Varying nomenclature for the petri nets may
be used, our conventions follows that of Jensen [20]. We Define
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Figure 2.4

Example of a Bipartite Graph

P N = < P, T, A, M >
P = (p1 , p2 , ....pn )
T = (t1 , t2 , ....tm )
A = (ap 1, ap 2...ap n)U (at 1, at 2....at m)
M = (m1 , m2 , ....mr )
{n, m, r ∈ I} [I denotes the set of positive integers]

where P is the set of places, T is the set of transitions, A is the set of directed arcs
connecting places and transitions, and M is the set of tokens resident in places at a
given moment.
Two distinct set of nodes exist. To be clear the arcs may only connect places
to transitions and transitions to places. In the case of the petri net tokens are
indistinguishable from one another. The number of tokens are depicted by a number
within a dot, or a number of dots representing the number of tokens present. A
non-negative number of tokens must be present in each place for a transition to fire.
Transitions are the crux of the petri nets ability to give dynamic qualities to
a static system. As described by Handley [13]: a transition is enabled when each
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Figure 2.5

A simple Petri Net Example

input place to a given transition has at least one token. If this criteria is met, the
transition may fire at this point and a token is taken from each input place to each
output place. The new assignment of the number of tokens to each place is the
dynamic characteristic of the system. When tokens are considered to be bits of
information, real world systems can be modeled.
Colored Petri Nets (CPN) are a generalization of Petri Nets which define tokens
as now having an attached data value called the token color. Restrictions are placed
on which places tokens may reside (dependent on color). Transitions are enabled by
a slightly different method. Input arch inscriptions specify the number and type of
tokens that must be in place for a transition to fire. Tokens may be investigated and
modified by the transition. Also, the transition’s functionality may be represented
by code that is run every time it fires [20].
The CPN is accepted as a rigorous method of dynamically modeling system
activities. Levis and Wagenhals [22] have laid rigorous methods to produce an executable model via CPN. Levis and Wagenhals, et al generated an architecture (describing Mobile’s SpeedPass “pay at the pump” system) and then used Petri Nets to
produce an executable model. In the case of this research the architectures that are
being considered are of new acquisitions in the DoD. It is important to note that the
Petri-Net work done by Levis is of a contrived architecture made to fit the Petri-Net
for a proof of concept. DoD architectures are not created with this in mind.
While the CPN is certainly a valuable tool for understanding the dynamic
behavior of a system, it falls short in its ability to model a combat environment
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where the rules of engagement (ROE) are changing and the enemy model is learning
and evolving. Clearly, to evaluate the military worth of a future system, you must
do so in a simulated combat environment - one in which the enemy has his own
architecture. The CPN is not well suited to accomplish this [31]. To address these
concerns, one must look toward modeling and simulation

2.5.2

MITRE
The MIRTE corporation also has recognized the role of architectures and the

standardization through DoDAF. The problem statement of a MIRTE study, Executable Architecture Methodology for Analysis (EAMA), states “static products lack
means to conduct a proper dynamic analysis of IT systems capabilities, behavior and
performance in its operational environment over time” [26]. The following solution
has been proposed. Develop a methodology to convert static architecture products
into executable architectures to support dynamic analysis of a system or capability,
and measure process performance along with organizational work efforts and resource
utilization over time. Develop a federation of simulations that represent the mission
threads (business processes), communications networks, and operational environment for the system being analyzed. Another goal is to generalize the methodology
to work with multiple models and multiple modeling tools.
EAMA intends to extract Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) from the architecture using Army combat simulation EAGLE, and the commercially available business
process model BONAPART. BONAPART, a Petri-Net tool, evaluates actions to be
taken at each time step, and these are fed into EAGLE for execution while the state
of the system is updated after any executions. This process allows the system represented by the architecture to be embedded within a combat model, EAGLE, for
evaluation. While the intermediate business process model step in this approach
will not be duplicated the overall goals and methodology parallel those of this study.
This ongoing research effort has not yet produced an evaluation of a system, but rec-
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ognizes the potential of architectures can be reached through the help of modeling
and simulation.

2.5.3

RAND
In an effort to improve the C4ISR capability SEAS version 2.3, the RAND cor-

poration compared a baseline C4ISR architecture, an improved airborne architecture
(IAA), and a satellite wide area surveillance architecture (SWAS). The C4ISR architectures were not created from DoDAF products, but from various Air Force and
Joint Publications documents [29]. The activities of the AOC are complemented by
two agents developed for the study. The first agent is a collection planning agent
to prepare a detailed plan for requirements and time in which the ISR assets collect
information. The second agent, ISR battle manager, dynamically determines how to
carry out the collection plan. While the architectures represented in this study are
slightly out of date, the level of effort required to accurately model the processes of
the AOC is of interest.
In addition to the added agents this study also enhanced sensors and ISR
metrics. These changes have been incorporated in to SEAS version 3.2 which is the
version used in this study. Further discussion of the finding of this study will be
discussed in chapter 5 as they impact the capability of SEAS to represent C4ISR
systems.

2.6

Summary
Recently there has been a significant trend in the utilization of ABM within

the DoD in efforts to capture C4ISR effects. The AFSAT has incorporated SEAS at
the mission level, and SEAS has been used for analysis in a wide range of scenarios.
Typically, SEAS analysis is used to identify first-order non-linear C4ISR effects for
further investigation. C4ISR interoperability issues have led to requirements for
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all new major weapon systems to be placed within a DoDAF. The completeness
of the DoDAF increases as the acquisition cycle progresses to eventually include
dynamic views which are essential in creating an executable model of the system.
The executable model is to provide an environment for the system to be evaluated in
over time. Evaluations of the system by the acquisition and warfighting communities
would benifit from a transfer of information from a system’s architectural products
into SEAS for further analysis of military worth in specific conflict scenarios.
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3. Methodology
3.1

Overview
This research is accomplished in three parts. First, the transfer of data from a

Time Critical Target (TCT) architecture in DoDAF format to SEAS will be investigated and accomplished. Second, once the data is transferred to SEAS a MUA of
the TCT process executed by the AOC represented by the architecture is conducted.
Finally, insight of how the AOC may perform its mission more effectively based on
MOE(s) from the MUA will be passed back to the architecture.
The gathering of data from the architecture requires detailed knowledge of
the available architectural products. Collaboration with AFIT System Engineering
Student Captain Drew Zinn has provided insight and data products of the proposed
architecture. The architecture chosen for evaluation and translation into SEAS is of
an Aerospace Operation Center (AOC) created for the Air Force by the MITRE Corporation in Hampton, VA. The provided architecture documents seven operational
activities to be accomplished by the AOC. The operational activities are:
CAOC-1.0-Produce Joint Air Operations Plan
CAOC-2.0-Provide Specific Guidance
CAOC-3.0-Task Available Capabilities/Forces
CAOC-4.0-Manage Aerospace Operations
CAOC-5.0-Evaluate Results of Joint Aerospace Operations
CAOC-6.0-Perform Airspace Control Authority (ACA)
CAOC-7.0-Plan, Task, Execute, and Assess Theater Air
The objective was to utilize architectural products to build a SEAS simulation to capture these operational activities. In previous work in creating executable
models from DoDAF architectural products, authors Levis and Wagenhals [22] emphasized the importance of a dynamics model in the process. The dynamics model
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is represented in the DoDAF with the OV-6. However, the OV-6 has not yet been
created for the AOC’s architecture.
Often when an area of architecture requires a higher level of attention a subset
of activities are modeled. This subset of activities which are modeled at a higher
level of detail than the rest of the architecture is called a ”key thread” [32]. Derived
from the AOC architecture, a Time Critical Targeting (TCT) key thread is also
available. The TCT is available as its own architecture which includes an OV-6
product. The TCT and AOC architectures share much of the same data, were built
by the same modeler, and describe common systems (although at different levels
of detail). Therefore, the goal of transforming the static views of architecture to
a dynamic executable model remains the same, but information is now extracted
from two architectures. Furthermore, the objective of the study has transformed
into capturing the operational activities of TCT conducted by the AOC.
TCT-1.0 Analyze ATO period for dynamic targeting opportunities
TCT-2.0 Monitor battlespace for dynamic events
TCT-3.0 Verify event is/is not of interest
TCT-4.0 Adjust Theater ISR to support dynamic air operations
TCT-5.0 Define target/target set
TCT-6.0 Determine target significance/urgency
TCT-7.0 Validate target/target set
TCT-8.0 Nominate engagement options
TCT-9.0 Execute engagement options
TCT-10.0 Attack target
TCT-11.0 Conduct dynamic assessment of target
Utilizing the aforemention OV product this research evaluates the AOC and
TCT architectures to ensure we properly model the TCT thread within a SEAS
warfile. The warfile is a text file describing scenario agents along with their heirarchy
and behaviors. Preceding these actions an evaluation of the communications process,
command and control, and execution of orders in SEAS is conducted. This allows for
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proper placement (logical and spatial) of the assets, communications, and physical
characteristics of the system represented by the architecture. The means and validity
of transferring each of these categories of data will also be addressed in this chapter.
With proper characterization of all TCT aspects in SEAS we have an executable
model for the architecture. It is important to note that the coding of the AOC agent
and TCT activities in SEAS, not only changes the AOC asset in the scenario, but
changes the entire model of war. The actions of AOC and other agents are altered
with the change and creation of agent orders. Thus, the change of interactions
between agents create a new model for the agents to follow.
A MUA is conducted within a probable environment of future U.S. engagements. Traditional and non-traditional MOEs are used to capture the effect of TCT
in the scenario chosen. Any adjustment in activities of the TCT to improve the
MOE(s) will then be recommended as added capabilities or transformation of operations of the AOC. These recommendations will be passed to Zinn and attempted
to be captured in the architecture.

3.2

Scenario
A number of priority operational challenges have been identified by a capabilities-

based planning study prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense [7]. One
operational challenge has been identified as an effective stop-the-killing intervention
in a small-scale contingency. A recent encounter with this type of scenario is the U.S.
involvement in Kosovo in 1999. Insight to our capability to be effective in this type
of operational challenge can be accomplished via the agent based combat simulation
SEAS.
The Space and Missile Center Transformation Directorate (SMC/TD) has created a warfile in SEAS to represent a typical mission in the Kosovo war. The warfile
created in SEAS contains all information of the environment, entities, and timing
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of the events to be modeled. This particular warfile consists of U.S. forces, Serbian
forces, and Kosovar militia and civilians. In SEAS the U.S. forces are owned by
a master unit agent, the AOC, which passes orders to its subordinate assets. The
AOC’s available assets are those representatives of what we would bring to war in
a smaller scale theater conflict such as Kosovo. Figure 3.1 represents the assets of
the USAFE (United States Air Forces Europe) in the scenario. The Unit agents
shown are all owned by the USAF Combined Aerospace Operations Center (CAOC)
agent. The platform agents are encompassed by the unit agents as they are subordinate agents. Both the unit and platform agents own equipment. All these agents
act within the environment which has an effect on movement and individual sensors
probability of detection.

Figure 3.1

Blue Agent Force Structure

3-4

In contrast, the AOC architecture was built considering a current theater response package (TRP). The AOC architecture provides information on all elements
common to most AOCs put together for a TRP. Available external assets such as
long range bombers and reach-back capabilities of the AOC exceed that of the SMC
scenario. No new assets have been modeled in SEAS as the goal is to capture the
activities of TCT utilizing the assets available in the Kosovo scenario provided.
The provided scenario representation of Serbian forces remain unchanged. Serbian unit agents include air defenses, ground targets, and three army divisions. These
are labelled as Serb Pristine AD, Serb groundtgts, and Serb Armor1,2 &3 respectively in the warfile. The Serbian air defense unit consists of two surface-to-air(SA)-6,
one SA-3, and one air traffic control unit agent. The air defense unit owns a tactical
communication system, RedTac Ord, to relay commands and broadcast variables.
Each SA-6 battery consists of two radar vans, RedSA61RadarVan, eight transporter
erector launchers(tels),RedSA61Tel, and the RedTac Ord communication channel.
Once the agents and communication equipment are created in SEAS a hierarchal
display of the force structure is available. Figure 3.2 displays the breakdown of
the Serbian force agent to the platform agent level. Each platforms owned sensors,
communication equipment, and weapons are also shown.
The Serbian force is not centralized as is the blue force possessing the CAOC
unit agent which owns all other blue agents. Of course, the five main Serbian unit
agents may pass orders to their subordinate agents, and they all may share information as they are connected via the RedTac Ord communication equipment. All
units are given orders to operate as expected in war. For instance, the SA radar
vans are given orders to hide when information is passed that an F15 is near, or to
hide and move after firing a missile.
As in the Serbian forces no regular forces are available for the Kosovars. As
seen in Figure 3.3 only scattered poorly communicating militia and civilians are
modeled. Cellular phones, bells, and shouting are the forms of communication for
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Figure 3.2

Serbian Force Structure

the Kosovars. Vehicle platform agents are bicycles, pushcarts, and tractors. The only
sensors are the human eyes, or K-eyes as in the warfile. This irregular structure and
equipment are able to be modeled due to the flexible nature of the SEAS warfile.
Instead of the Kosovars being placed in aggregated masses at certain locations they
can be modeled as agents who can pass along information to the U.S. forces and
hide from the enemy. This adds elements to the war scenario that are difficult and
not typically modeled in other simulations.
The orders and communications of the Serbian and Kosovar forces will not be
altered. They are evaluated to provide knowledge of the enemies capabilities and
possible behaviors to illuminate weakness for TCT to take advantage of.
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Figure 3.3
3.3
3.3.1

Kosovar Force Structure

Data Transfer to SEAS
Communications
The first issue addressed in the transfer of data from the architecture to SEAS

was the communication structure of the AOC with its assets in carrying out the
TCT mission. Modeling the information flow between assets is critical to getting an
accurate picture of the C4ISR effects from the simulation. If a satellite is passing
information to the AOC, but the AOC is not able to transmit that information to
the proper assets the benefit of the satellites information is not captured.

3.3.2

Communications in SEAS
In SEAS communication equipment is explicitly assigned to each agent. Com-

munication equipment have definable range, delay, and reliability of the messages
they transmit and receive. The messages pass over channels which have a definable
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time that a message will be held, and a maximum number of messages that can be
passed over the channel in one time step. Weather and terrain effect the reliability
of message transmission and range of message reception respectively.
The mode and message type attributes of the communication equipment define
the direction and type of information to be passed respectively. The mode attribute
establishes the direction of the message flow by:
M ode = 1, transmit
M ode = 2, receive
M ode = 3, both

SEAS allows three message types to be passed over the communication network.
M essageT ype = 1, target sightings are passed
M essageT ype = 2, commands are passed
M essageT ype = 3, broadcast variables are passed

Target sightings are passed as locations in (latitude(lat),longitude(long), and altitude(alt)) format. Commands tell the receiving agent to move to a new location,
abort a mission, or any numerous other commands the analyst programs. More
than one message type may be passed over communication channel(s) by adding the
number of the message types to be passed. For instance, a five placed in the message
type attribute would allow commands and broadcast variables to be passed over the
communication channel.
To aid in establishing understanding of the current SEAS scenario’s communication the network in Figure 3.4 was created. The nodes represent the AOC master
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unit (center), and all platform agents subordinate to the AOC. The connecting lines
represent the communication links between all agents. The nomenclature of each
communication link conveys the communication device name used in SEAS to connect the nodes. The message type and mode are represented in each link. For
instance, the link between the Predator and the AOC is labelled PredUAV

TAC

ORD(2,3). Thus allowing commands (Message Type 2) to be passed over this link
in both directions (Mode 3). Any arrow pointing directly into a platform or unit
agent represents sensors owned by the agent feeding information to the platform. A
separate network, Figure 3.5, has been built for the satellite communication with the
AOC. Satellites are not controlled by the AOC or any other agent. They transmit
information to the AOC and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit agents in this
scenario.
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Figure 3.4

AOC Communication with Group & Air Assets
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Figure 3.5

AOC & Satellite Communication

The networks were created after the warfile, but the intent is to create a method
to keep track of all communication links between agents. This became instrumental
when sorting through architecture products, shown in the next section, to keep track
of communication information.
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3.3.3

Communications in DoDAF
The DoDAF offers most communications information in the architectural views

OV-3 (Information Exchange Matrix) and SV-2 (Systems Communication). An OV3 provides all information exchanges between nodes in the architecture, and even
the information within a node. Within the AOC node there are numerous instances
of information passed from one cell to another cell to accomplish activities. The
information exchange gives insight of the message type and mode that is established
between agents in SEAS.
A need line tells who is passing the information and who is receiving. An example of the provided OV-3 product from Zinn displaying all the AOC to fighter/bomber
platforms information exchanges can be seen in Figure 3.6. At a minimum this requires that communication is established between the two agents in SEAS. The title
of the information exchange and the sending and receiving activity blocks give insight
about the information to be passed. An information exchange block labelled mission
change orders conveys that orders, message type 2, will need to be passed over the
communication channel in SEAS. This is reaffirmed by the names of the sending
and receiving activities (i.e. divert, cancel, and re-role mission are required). The
information exchange matrix was then examined for need lines from fighter/bomber
to AOC. This is done to establish the mode to be set on the agents communications.
The OV-3 provided is that of the broad scoped AOC architecture, so only those
need lines involving assets available in the Kosovo scenario have been examined. The
OV-3 does not provide the means that the information is to be transmitted by, how
often, or its precedence over other information. The SV-6, system data exchange
matrix, does include information on media, format, protocol, and size of data which
would answer some of these questions. However, the information in these columns
is not filled in, so we are left to ascertain these characteristics from other products.
It is preferable to use the OV-3, at any rate, as explained in Zinn’s thesis, section

3-12

NEED LINE

INFORMATION
EXCHANGE

SENDING
NODE

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

Operations
Direction &
Guidance

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

Mission Change
Orders

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

Dynamic
Targeting
Execution
Orders
Critical aircrew
information
On-call CAS
Scramble/
Execution Order

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

CSAR Direction
and Guidance

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

CSAR Execution
Order

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

CSAR
Engagement
Status Update

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

CSAR Asset
Retasking

CAOC

CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber
CAOC to
Fighter/Bomber

Figure 3.6

CAOC
CAOC

SENDING ACTIVITY

RECEIVING
NODE

RECEIVING ACTIVITY

CAOC-4.0-Manage Aerospace
Operations Execution
CAOC-4.5-Manage dynamic
targeting execution
CAOC-4.5.3-Manage unique
dynamic target missions
CAOC-4.4.4.2.2-Divert, cancel, rerole missions as required
CAOC-4.6.4.2.3.1-Direct diverts
as required

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

CAOC-4.5.2.9-Execute
engagement option (Engage)
CAOC-4.5.2.9.2-Issue execution
orders
CAOC-7.3.4-Pass critical
information to aircrews for time
CAOC-4.5.3.1.1-Manage sortie
diversion for on-call CAS

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information
Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

CAOC-4.5.3.2-Coordinate CSAR
missions (assumes existence of
an JRCC in the
CAOC-4.5.3.2.5-Execute
engagement option (Engage)
CAOC-4.5.3.2.5.6-Coordinate
CAOC-4.5.3.2.4-Determine
engagement option (Target)
CAOC-4.5.3.2.4.2-Receive
approval for engagement option
CAOC-4.5.3.2.5-Execute
engagement option (Engage)
CAOC-4.5.3.2.5.6-Coordinate
intel and SERE debrief of survivor
CAOC-4.5.3.2.5.4.2-Retask
assets as required

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Ftr/Bmbr-2-Receive C2
information

Ftr/Bmbr

Example OV-3 Product - AOC to Fighter/Bomber

4.1.2. Regardless whether the OV-3 or SV-6 is used to describe the content of the
data, neither product is intended to describe how it is transmitted.
To do this, the SV-2 “System Communication Description” is required. The
SV-2(see Figure 3.7) may provide other information such as bandwidth, frequency,
and the communication system used. This information aids in the reliability, delay,
and range parameters set in SEAS. However, we are not dealing with one complete
architecture and the SV-2 is provided via the AOC architecture. The SV-2 for
the AOC architecture is incomplete leaving much information to be extrapolated
from the OV-3. Most of the information can be discerned from investigation into
the receiving and sending activities, but the incomplete architecture creates the
opportunity to misrepresent the system.
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Figure 3.7

Example SV-2 product - Systems for AOC to Fighter Bomber Exchange

The sending and receiving activities shown in the information exchange matrix
can be further investigated in the activity model diagrams which are products of the
OV-5. The TCT and AOC architectures provide OV-5 products.
An activity is represented by IDEFØ, a method designed to model the decisions, actions, and activities of an organization or system, which is a simple graphical
language of box and arrows (see Figure 3.8). The input to the activity is information received from another activity or source. Controls are constraints such as the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) that govern our conduct in war. Mechanisms are
who or what conducts the activity. In this case the who may be a C2 warrior in
the AOC, and the what may be a linear programming model to optimize received
inputs. Outputs are the data product that are passed on to the next activity.
Arrows flowing in and out of the activity blocks represent the inputs, controls,
outputs, and mechanisms (ICOMs) used to guide the activity’s actions and decisions.
The ICOMs are labelled with the information it passes. This allows us to focus on the
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Figure 3.8

IDEFØ Format

information exchanges between the activities in TCT via the TCT’s OV-5 products.
These are derived from the same information exchanges described in the OV-3 from
the AOCs architecture. The OV-5 product offers a definition of the information
exchange of each ICOM arrow. Instead of relying only upon the information exchange
and sending and receiving activities titles from the OV-3, the definition adds to the
insight of the information to be passed over the communication link. In the case of
TCT and AOC architectures few ICOMs are completed with these definitions.
At this stage of the analysis it is determined that the communication structure
built by SMC provides the necessary communication channels for platforms to share
information and send/receive orders. Only a few changes to the message types have
been made to the original structure. This is in part due to lack of information
provided via the architecture. This shortcoming will be discussed in Chapter 5.
In short, the OV-3 and OV-5 provide the information to be exchanged and the
SV-2 shows communication systems to be used, but which information flows over
individual channels between two nodes is not available. All information flowing
between two agents has been aggregated into potentially fewer channels between
agents.
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3.3.4

Activities
With communications and the correct hierarchy of agents complete for the blue

force, information involving activities necessary in conducting TCT was then sought
from the architecture. TCT targets are those that fall below the joint integrated
prioritized target list (JIPTL), or desired information is received to late to add to
the Air Tasking Order (ATO), a scheduled attack plan for the AOC’s assets to
execute. In a typical TRP TCT targets are attacked with a small subset of the
AOC’s assets which are set aside explicitly for this purpose. However, due to the
nature of the engagement the AOC modeled in the Kosovo baseline scenario does
not produce or follow an ATO. Therefore, this study considers many of assets owned
by the AOC agent as available and tasks them to execute the TCT mission.
The TCT architecture OV-5 product yields a diagram in IDEFØ of the eleven
operational activities, stated in the overview. Figure 3.9 displays TCT operational
activities 1 and 2 with their associated ICOM arrows. This product is somewhat
useful in determining the type of orders needed to accomplish these activities in
SEAS. However, the OV-5 IDEFØ format does not capture sequence or timing of
the events that generate these activities.
In the TCT architecture each OV-5 has an OV-6a rules model associated with
it. The logic or timing associated with activities are captured via the IDEF3, process flow and object state description capture method, used in the OV-6a. Logical
statements with nomenclature X, O, and & (XOR,OR,AND) are utilized to show
the information needed to move along within the activities processes.
In Figure 3.10 a breakout of the OV-6a rules model for the Attack Target
activity is shown. The large blocks describe units of behaviors to be executed once
information is passed along to it. In this case if the decision is made that the target
is static then that target is to be monitored for movement. If no movement is seen,
the target coordinates are then passed along to an O (OR) junction where the target
is updated with coordinates rather than a vector.
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Figure 3.9

Activities 1 & 2 from the TCT OV-5 product

To model all OV-6 unit of behaviors and decisions nodes in SEAS would require
the creation of a vast number of agents and variables to manage data and process
decisions. The information passed through the TCT is not solely generated from
the activities of the TCTs OV-5, but from all the AOC activities where no OV-6 is
available. In the event the data becomes available it is possible to create all these
agents and variables, but to model the hundreds or potentially thousands of agents in
an AOC shifts from the mission/campaign level nature of SEAS. SEAS is generally
used to identify first-order C4ISR effects for further investigation via other means.
Instead a synthesis of OV-5 and OV-6 products was created to model each
activity such that the model captures the essence of each activity. Critical events
and decisions completed by each activity were mapped to internal SEAS functionality
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Figure 3.10

Breakout of Rules Model: Attack Target Activity

or code in the agent orders written. As an aid to write the agent orders from these
products Zinn provided psuedocode for each activity. The activity was written in an
IF, Then, Else format translating the graphic product of the OV-6 and providing
language relevant to most standard programming languages. Below is an example
of the psuedocode for activity 7.
Pseudo Code for Activity 7 - Based from IDEF3 Diagram
Determine if the target is valid
IFthe target is on the (Dynamic Target Watch List) OR (the ATO/JIPTL)
Then continue validation
Else
IF(The target is consistent with Dynamic Target Execution
direction and guidance for the JFAC) AND (LOAC and ROE have been reviewed)
Then continue validation
Else not a TCT-pass on to ATO planners
Considerations: Predict adversary reaction
Provide collateral damage consideration
Determine political sensitivity of target
OUTPUT: Nominate Validated Target for Attack
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Figure 3.11 is a decision flow of the activities in the TCT created from the
OV-5, OV-6, pseudocode products. Many underlying behaviors of the OV-6 are not
displayed, but essential to the overall process flow shown. This diagram serves as
a guide to code and evaluate SEAS such that each of the following activities are
explicitly or implicitly accounted for in the scenario.

Figure 3.11

TCT Process Flow Diagram Created via OV-5 & OV-6 Products

The first activity, labelled A1 in the TCT flow diagram, is the generation of
a dynamic target watch list (DTWL). This is a prioritized list of potential enemy
targets expected to be seen in the scenario. From the DTWL this activity produces
the weaponeering solutions for possible targets in the battlespace which are to be
monitored. The weaponeering solutions are defined by the probability of kill (Pk )
table in SEAS. For instance, a Joint Standoff Weapon JSOW carried by the F15, is
assigned a .8 probability of kill Pk to the RedSA61RadarVan. SEAS does not allow
a weapon to engage a target if no Pk assignment has been made. The creation of
the Pk table is left to the analyst as targets and weapons are scenario dependent.
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These weapon to target pairing are predetermined before allocating assets for TCT
missions.
The DTWL representation is completed in two parts. First, an entry is made
in the probability of detection (Pd ) table in SEAS assigning sensor detection for
a particular target type. This follows the logic of the Pk table, with no detection
possible if no assignment has been made. Once the assignment is made it is then
possible for the sensors to pass information among agents via the communications
network. Second, following the DTWL priority hierarchy set forth by decision makers
in the AOC, an array of global variables representing each target type is defined
below. This array explicitly categorizes each target type which allows the AOC
agent to make decisions such as which target to attack first and priority of the
retasking of ISR assets.
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F15 DTWL[0] = ”RedSA3RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[1] = ”RedSA61RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[2] = ”RedSA62RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[4] = ”RedSA61Tel”
F15 DTWL[5] = ”RedSA62Tel”
F15 DTWL[6] = ”T80”
F15 DTWL[7] = ”Serb Groundtgt3 Veh”
F15 DTWL[8] = ”Serb Groundtgt2 Veh”
F15 DTWL[9] = ”Serb Groundtgt1 Veh”
F16 DTWL[0] = ”Serb Groundtgt1 Veh”
F16 DTWL[1] = ”Serb Groundtgt2 Veh”
F16 DTWL[2] = ”Serb Groundtgt3 Veh”
F16 DTWL[3] = ”T80”

Activity 2, monitor the battlespace with sensors, is left to the inherent abilities
of SEAS. Once an agent is deployed its sensors have the ability to detect targets on
its Pd list. In the scenario ISR assets are placed in orbits above the battlespace.
Activity 3, verify the events of interest, is accomplished implicitly by the use
of sensors probability of identification (P Id ) attribute. P Id is the contribution the
sensor provides in correctly identifying the target where 0 denotes no contribution.
SEAS requires a P Id Commit threshold to be met before a weapon may attack a
target. This is to avoid attacking targets where poor or little data is available.
The AOC is privy to all sensor data collected from its agents, so when a target is
sighted even with a low P Id , the AOC is aware of the information. Once a target is
detected it is placed on the sensors platform agents Local Target List (LTL) and the
information is sent to the AOC. The information passed includes Target Location
Error (TLE), Target Velocity Error (TLV), and mass of the target. If the information
passed is categorized as a threat on the DTWL further action may be warranted.
Activity 4 is to Move ISR Assets. In the baseline scenario a Global Hawk
flew an orbit on the edge of the main area of interest. Due to the Global Hawk’s
position and sensor capability it has been designated as the reassignable ISR asset.
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The Global Hawk may be programmed in a variety of ways in the TPL to move
to a new TAO. In the orders displayed below the Global Hawk ISR asset is told to
move once sighting a target on the (DTWL), Priority Mass 0, is sensed from a blue
asset passing back a probability of identification (P Id ) lower than the PId Commit
threshold. The Global Hawk moves to a new TAO, Investigate TAO, with the target
sighting location as the center. The Global Hawk completes at least one orbit before
it can be told to move to another location, and remains in that orbit as long as it is
sensing targets, not in danger, or no other higher priorities exist.
Orders
Declare Global Priority loc Priority mass
Declare Global Investigate TAO
While me -> Status! =2
End While
While (me->Status ==2)
If Priority mass > 0
Move Investigate TAO
While me -> Location! = me -> Goal
EndWhile
Else distance(Priority loc, Location(19.484556, 42.73121331, 4000)) < 10
Move “GH Oribit”
EndIf
EndWhile
EndOrders
END

Activity 5, categorization and verification of the target, is accomplished while
this Global Hawk is flying its new TAO when sighted sensor information (TLE, TVE,
and mass) is placed on the Global Hawks LTL. The LTL is passed back to the AOC
at some defined broadcast interval (BI). Now the AOC categorizes the target type
and location with a higher probability of the P Id ≥ P Id Commit.
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Activity 6, to track and determine if the target will remain vulnerable, can
be accomplished in SEAS, and is target dependent. TLV information from the
sensor(s) detecting the target is available. Once a target is placed on a platforms
Local Orders List (LOL) the target distance is calculated via the TLV, time of the
sighting and current simulation time. If the target is expected to be out of the
weapons range (defined in the weapons section of the warfile) the weapon is not
fired. Also, rules may be written to determine a targets’ vulnerability. Within this
scenario we are presented with the case of mobile radar, tanks, and trucks that do
not remain vulnerable as they can hide via movement and/or no sensor emissions.
No solution to this activity was coded in the study.
Activity 7, validation of target in the case of a first strike, is left to the P Id
and P Id commit measures. Omitting Activity 7 after the first strike is noteworthy
as it can not be determined from the OV5 product alone.
Activity 8, nominate engagement option, is accomplished in part by Pk tables,
and in part by orders. The Pk assignment allows platform weapons to be launched
against the target. F15s are assigned to all scenario targets, and F16s are assigned
to tanks and ground targets (see the DTWL). When assets are available they fly
to the highest priority target type first. Priority has been set in the F15 and F16
squadron unit orders.
Activity 9, attack orders, are often scenario and target dependent. Each plane
agent has orders to avoid the nearest SA radar as it moves towards a target. Other
orders such as flying through various waypoints, directly flying to a target, number
of munitions and planes sent to attack, or turning off radar on the way to a target
are some possible attack orders. This is a very flexible and easily manipulated
functionality of SEAS. For this scenario basic orders for the plane agents have been
established based on the given threats.
Activity 10 is to perform BDA via asset and ISR sensors and then decide if
to reattack. Each sensor has a BDA probability and time associated with it. If a
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target is BDA as dead, it is removed from the LTL and is no longer attacked. If the
BDA is not accomplished or shows no damage, the target remains on the LTL and
the platform may be assigned orders to reattack. SEAS does not model the case of
considering a live target dead.

3.3.5

General Attributes
Communications and orders encompass much of the necessary information to

define an agent and its behavior in SEAS. However, they do not account for attributes
such as performance characteristics (i.e. speed), number of personnel associated with
the agent, and deployment procedures. Architecture data products used to fill in
these general attributes are the SV-7, OV-4, and SV-1. For this study most general
attributes have been set from external sources. Zinn [32] discusses the deficiencies
in the architecture data products to generate this information.

3.4

Verification and Validation
Several tools and techniques have been employed throughout the process of

building the SEAS model of AOC’s TCT activities to ensure a valid model which
captures the events and behaviors of interest. Some standard methods employed
were a structured walk-through of the code, consultation with experts, viewing the
animation, and looking for reasonable output. SEAS, provides a details and debug
window that were useful in this process.
The following states some of the benefits of the mentioned model verification
and validation methods. A structured walk-through of the code was accomplished
every time an agents orders had been changed. Each agents orders are dependent
upon global and local variables. If these variables are not updated with a change in
orders some action(s) may not occur. Consultation with experts at SMC (a primary
user of SEAS), Sparta Inc. (model managers), and RAND (analysts) were also used
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throughout this study. These analysts provided insight to code limitations, past
studies, and a second set of eyes on the code generated from this study. Viewing the
animation was integral in determining if the global hawk moved to a new TAO. The
screen capture (see Figure 3.12) of SEAS shows TAOs in white. The blue sensor
circles represent the agent senor’s field of regard. It is clear to see the global hawk
as diverted from its TAO to investigate a potential target.

Figure 3.12

Global Hawk Diverting from TAO to Investigate a Target

SEAS provides a details window which allows the analyst to view agents status
(dead or alive), current location, goal location, and number of targets. The debug
window provides a view of any agents global and local variable values, attribute
values, and local target list at every time step. The debug window proved invaluable
in the validation of agent orders. Used in concert these methods and tools allowed
a sound model of the TCT activities to be represented.
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3.5

Analysis Plan
Now that a basic model of TCT is complete the aforemention MUA of the

architecture can proceed. One hundred monte carlo runs of each the baseline model
from SMC and a basic TCT model built as defined in this section are performed.
The replications provide a distribution of the events of interest occurring over time.
Standard MOEs will be collected and evaluated, and other analysis methods are
employed to capture the effectiveness of TCT.

3.6

Summary
The overall goal of generating an executable model of a system represented in

the DoDAF, has been accomplished. Complete data products would offer opportunity for a more automated, and rigorous transformation of data. However, sufficient
data was available to capture the overall methods and effects of TCT.
Figure 3.13 gives a high level view of the data transfer from the architectures
to SEAS. Data available from the OV-3 (or SV-6) and SV-2 produced the communication structure in SEAS. Aggregation of the communication channels restricts the
ability to evaluate attacks on communications. To properly identify such effects as
jamming of the UHF band, information that flows over these channels is necessary.
This is not a flaw of the DoDAF, just a result of an incomplete architecture.
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Figure 3.13

Figure 3.14

Figure 3.15

Architecture Data Products Producing Communications in SEAS
Warfile

Architecture Data Products Producing Orders in SEAS Warfile

Architecture Data Products Filling General Attributes in SEAS
Warfile
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Figure 3.14 displays the products used to create orders in SEAS. Creating
orders in SEAS to represent the TCT thread was restricted by no available OV-6
for the AOC architecture, and limitations in SEAS. Information for decisions to be
made in TCT activities are generated externally or via activities in the AOC. Figure
3.15 yields the data products used to create general attributes for the AOC agent in
SEAS. Filling the general attributes into SEAS is data TBD in DoDAF. While the
TCT thread is not completely mapped into our SEAS model, we demonstrate and
assess the retasking of ISR assets in Chapter 4.
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4. Analysis
4.1

Overview
This chapter describes the results of the evaluation of the Baseline model,

and the comparison of the Baseline and TCT models. The nature of the scenario
and comparing the two systems are main drivers in the measures discussed here.
First, the Kosovo-type situation calls for direct measures of military utility such as a
reduction or cease in civilian casualties while keeping the number of blue causalities
to a minimum. Also, a comparison of systems typically involves collecting measures
like performance trade-offs and cost. While this information may be obtained via
traditional MOE output of SEAS (number of bodies, vehicles, weapons, and dollars
lost), trends in agent kills over time have also been captured in this study. This
allows for possible identification of emergent enemy behaviors, successful periods of
TTPs, a proper length of time to run the simulation, and possible classification of
phases of the war.

4.2

Baseline Scenario Analysis
As mentioned in the discussion of SEAS, each agent is given a set of orders.

These orders coupled with underlying default agent behaviors, and interaction with
other agents guide the agent through the simulation. While it would be exhaustive
to define each rule set and its implications on the scenario some important high level
operation information is given here. Each Forces’ Concept of Operations (ConOps)
for the baseline model have remained unchanged from that received from SMC/TD.
The USAFE ConOps do not retask ISR assets. This means each ISR asset is given
a TAO to fly for the duration of the scenario. Also, the ranking of target priorities
for the F15s remain constant over time. These priorities are lumped into a primary
group including radar vans, and a secondary target group including all other targets.
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For more detail one can refer to the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 on SEAS, or
the entire warfile can be found at AFIT’s Center for Operational Analysis.
A set of exploratory simulation runs were completed to determine an appropriate length of time to run the simulation. These runs suggested no significant activity
occurred after 6000 minutes of simulation time, and no event based criteria to stop
the simulation was uncovered (e.g. all Serbian forces are killed or withdrew). Therefore, the time to end the simulation was set at one hundred hours (6000 minutes).
To provide enough data points to properly compare this baseline with the TCT one
hundred replications of the simulation were run. This also reduces the variability
while evaluating events within the Baseline mode.
The total count of agent kills over the one hundred replications is used in
the following plots to describe and compare the models. The total count is used
to illustrate the behavior of the war over time as any one replication has a very
small number of kills. Figure 4.1 displays the total number of kills of each class of
platform agent over the scenario run time. This overall picture of kills vs. time was
particularly useful in identifying two phases of the war. Phase I, origin of the war
to 48 hours, is considered a SEAD phase. Figure 4.2 displays the high density of red
radar kills as compared to other activities in the scenario. Phase II is considered as
intervention of killing on the ground (see Figure 4.3). This phase is highlighted by
a large distribution of Kosovar kills as opposed to other activities occurring during
this time.
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Baseline: Phase II Agent Kills
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To highlight the key factors in the outcome of the scenario, Figures 4.4 and
4.5 display time and quantity measures of Kosovar agent kills. Each Kosovar house
and pushcarts platform agent has six and two associated bodies respectively. The
number of Kosovars killed is also relative to how the scenario was modeled. Since
SEAS has been coded with a vertical slice of the forces present, the number of
kills experienced would be some multiple of what we see here. In the case of the
F15 platform agent, Figure 4.1 shows early kills while the SAM threat is not yet
suppressed. A further looks shows most kills are from the SA3, with an average of
1 F15 killed per replication. By identifying that there is no killing of F15 agents
after Phase I, it may be plausible to change the priority of the F15 to kill Tanks
and SUVs. The TCT model with the concept of a DTWL priorities of targets may
change over time. Furthermore, the retasking of ISR assets may also change over
time to aid in the detection of the tanks.

4-4

Baseline: Kosovar Kills Over Time
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4.3

Model Comparison
The TCT model is run for one hundred replications beginning with the same

random number seed as the Baseline model. All changes and evaluations made
in chapter 3 have been implemented. Also, the F15 and ISR agents (global hawk
and predator) reprioritize targets to kill or detect 48 hours after the simulation has
started. Also, the F15s DTWL prioritization will then be changed to:
F15 DTWL[0] = “T80”

F15 DTWL[1] = “Serb Groundtgt3 Veh”
F15 DTWL[2] = “Serb Groundtgt2 Veh”
F15 DTWL[3] = “Serb Groundtgt1 Veh”
F15 DTWL[4] = “RedSA61RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[5] = “RedSA62RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[6] = “RedSA3RadarVan”
F15 DTWL[7] = “RedSA61Tel”
F15 DTWL[8] = “RedSA62Tel”
F15 DTWL[9] = “RedSA3Tel”

The global hawk and predator are retasked from their established orbits in two
phases. In Phase I they fly Investigate TAOs supporting the identification of SA
radars, and in Phase II they support identification of T80 tanks and Serbian ground
targets. This is to more appropriately capture the types of output from activities of
DTWL prioritization and ISR Retasking (see Figure 3.11).
Figure 4.6 compares the total count of Kosovar agents kills in the Baseline
and TCT models. The TCT model show a slight reduction in Kosovar kills with no
significant shift in the distribution of kills over time. A comparison of the agents
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responsible for killing the Kosovars can be seen in Figure 4.7. The TCT model shows
an overall greater number of T80 tank agent kills, but again no large shift in the
distribution of kills over time.
Baseline vs. TCT: Kosovar Agents Killed
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TCT vs. Baseline: Kosovar Agent Kill Comparison
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Baseline vs. TCT: Red Tank and SUV Agent Kills

Baseline_Red_SUV
TCT_Red_SUV

Count (over all replications)

Baseline_Red_Tank
TCT_Red_Tank

Figure 4.7

96

86

91

76

Baseline_Red_SUV
81

66

61

51

71

Time (h)

56

41

46

31

36

21

26

11

16

1

6

Baseline_Red_Tank

TCT vs. Baseline: Red Agent Kill Comparison

4-8

Table 4.1

Average and Differences of F15 Kills for Five Replications of the Two
Models
j
1
2
3
4
5

X1j
.35
.8
.85
.3
.95

X2j
.8
.4
.4
.55
.15

Zj
-.45
.4
.45
-.25
.8

To determine if the number of kills over all agent types has been significantly
reduced or increased from the baseline scenario by employing the TCT activities a
paired-t confidence interval approach is used. The approach allows us to compare
the expected responses by forming confidence intervals for the difference in the two
expectations. Table 4.1 yields the necessary statistics collected in SEAS to calculate
the paired-t confidence interval for the number of F15 kills. The one hundred runs for
each model are grouped into j = 5 replications of twenty runs. The average number
of F15 kills per replication are represented by Xi,j where i = the model (1 = Baseline,
2 = TCT) and j = replication. Each replication’s average is then subtracted from
one another, X1,j - X2,j , to yield Zj where j is as previously defined.
We then assume the Zj0 s to be independent and identically distributed (IID)
random variables. Next, an interval about the expected values of the differences is
calculated. The the expected value of the Zj0 s, is
Pn
j=1

Z(n) =

n

Zj

,

(4.0)

and the approximate 100(1 − α) percent confidence interval is defined by
s
Z(n) ± tn−1,1− α2
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z}|{
V ar[Z(n)]
.
n

(4.1)

Table 4.2
Agent Type
F15
Predator
Kosovar House
Kosovar Cart
SA3 Radar Van
SA3 Tel
SA61 Radar Van
SA61 Tel
SA62 Radar Van
SA61 Tel
Ground Tgt 1
Ground Tgt 2
Serbian SUV
Serbian Tank

Z(n)
.95
.1
4.05
-.1
0
.1
0
-.3
0
1.5
-2.35
-.85
-1.1
-3.3

Paired t-test for All Agents Killed

CI LowerBound
.4529
.0739
3.242
-.1723
0
.0272
0
-.6371
0
1.115
-2.503
-1.003
-1.977
-5.651

CI U pperBound
1.447
.1261
4.857
-.2770
0
.1728
0
.0371
0
1.884
-2.197
-.697
-0.223
-.9488

Reject Ø
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

M odel in F avor
TCT
TCT
TCT
Baseline
N/A
Baseline
N/A
N/A
N/A
Baseline
TCT
TCT
TCT
TCT

In the case when α = .1 and Z(n) = .95 the result is a lower CI bound of .453
and upper CI bound of 1.447. This leads us to reject the null hypothesis that there
is no difference between the models in the number of F15 kills. We can further state
that the TCT model leads to a statistically significant lower average number of F15
kills at 90% level of confidence.
This same procedure was applied to all platform agents killed in the scenario
and results are shown in Table 4.2. The table gives the expected value of the difference, Z(n),along with the CI bounds. A Yes/No decision to reject the null hypothesis
based on whether the CI contains zero is made. The difference in kills, if applicable,
is then credited to which scenario it favors. For instance, we always would like to see
more SA6 tels killed. The SA61 Tel agents Z(n) = 1.5 which tells us that we expect
to see 1.5 less SA6s killed in the TCT model thus giving this measure in favor to the
Baseline.
While Table 4.2 shows most kills are in favor of the TCT model the Baseline
model does show an advantage in the number of SA Tel and Kosovar Cart kills. The
total number of Kosovar Cart kills over all replications is an extremely low count
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(three for the Baseline model), so little analysis or interest is paid to this comparison.
In the matter of the SA Tel kills the answer is a matter of a trade-off in attacking the
more lethal SA3 radar with the highest priority as opposed to attacking all SA radars
with the highest priority (most tel kills are a result of the F15 air-to-ground radar
picking up the tel while attacking a near by radar van). When considering these
differences in agent kills we must also take into account the operational significance
of the difference. The differential of .1 SA3 Tels will most likely have no impact on
the scenario, and 1.5 additional SA6 Tels are of limited use if the SA6 radar van is no
longer operational. Also when considering operational impact in the TCT scenario
each Kosovar House agent includes six civilians. The reduction, on average, of 4.05
Kosovar houses per replication is reducing the number of dead Kosovar civilians by
24.
The TCT activities utility and impact on the scenario is not solely reflected
in outcomes like number of kills. Other measures such as the effectiveness of sorties
flown needs also to be addressed. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 displays a comparison, over
time, of the number and effectiveness of sorties respectively. From these figures we
see an increase in sortie effectiveness that is most noticeable during Phase II. Also,
the Baseline model produced 6661 total F15 sorties as opposed to 5111 total sorties
produced in the TCT model. The greatest reduction in the number flown is also
seen in Phase II.
Insight from the sortie comparison data (less and more effective sorties) is
incomplete without measures on the number of kills. This is due in part since SEAS
calculations on sortie effectiveness are based on the number of bombs dropped, and
not the number of targets hit. From Table 4.2 we see that most kills are reduced
or in the case of killing tanks increased in favor of the TCT model. The practical
significance of these changes is left to the decision-maker. However, the same or even
better overall mission outcomes are obtained with less sorties flown.
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Number flown over 100
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Baseline vs. TCT: Number of Sorties Flown
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4.4

Summary
The results from this chapter demonstrated the modeled TCT activities had

significant impact on the number of agent kills, and sorties flown in the Kosovo
scenario. Initial analysis of behavior over time identified two phases of the war.
From this the F15 priorities and ISR retasking in the TCT model were programmed
to be updated after the first phase. These updates coupled with the modeled TCT
activities favorable statistically significant changes in agent kills are realized. Further
analysis illuminated the fact fewer and more effective sorties accomplish these more
favorable outcomes in the TCT model.
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5. Conclusions
5.1

Overview
This research utilized agent based simulation to create an executable model

of a C4ISR weapon system represented within the DoDAF. This is done by the
identification of possible methods of consistent integration of Operation and System
View products into SEAS. The TCT model of the AOC and its operations were built
from these views found in the architecture. Consistent integration of these products
is integral to a valid comparison of the relative utility of alternative architectures
and TTPs were the TCT model would effectively serve as an ”approved baseline”.
This chapter presents a summary of the utility analysis of the AOC as represented
by the TCT key thread architecture when placed within the SEAS Kosovo scenario.
Differences realized between the TCT and Baseline models provide justification for
utilizing architectures, when available, as viable source documentation for M & S.
Limitations due to information not yet completed in the architecture are addressed.
Also, recommendations for SEAS to be more receptive to architectural view products
are presented. Finally, suggestions for future research are made.

5.2

Summary of MUA
Comparisons of the two models, Baseline and TCT, are measured by data

extracted from one hundred replications of each scenario. Traditional MOEs are
useful in describing the overall combat outcome (i.e. number of bodies lost over the
entire war). This research also extracted measures over time uncovering trends of
behavior to be exploited by the AOC activities described in TCT thread.
The number of agent kills over time illuminated two phases of the war classified as SEAD and Intervention of Killing. After identifying these phases, focus on
shifting the TCT thread architecture led us to F15 priorities and ISR retasking at
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the 48 hour point. In the absence of a human (or more realistic modeling of the
AOC) this shift was intended to capture some decisions made in analyzing targeting opportunities and readjusting theater ISR support. These changes being made,
along with sufficiently capturing other TCT activities, the TCT model is executed
and then compared.
Results show the Blue force in Phase I is effective for both the baseline and the
TCT mission. The casualties of Blue force agents (F15 and Predator) are minimal
and SA kills high, but some subtle differences are evident. The SA3 rather than the
SA6 proved to be more lethal to the F15. The TCT model focuses its early missions
on the SA3 radars influencing the reduction of overall F15 kills. The number of F15
kills are shown to be statistically significantly different via the t-test performed (see
table 4.2).
Phase II analysis displayed no divergent behavior in the time of kills between
the models (i.e. the TCT model did not influence the Serbian forces to interact
with Kosovar civilian later in the war). However, the TCT model displayed overall
reductions in the number of Kosovars, Serbian ground targets, Serbian tanks, and
Serbian SUVs killed. Also, the overall number of sorties flown in the TCT model are
significantly less, with sorties flown in Phase II being significantly more effective.
While effectiveness is calculated by number of weapons released per sortie, it can
still be said that the same (or better) overall mission is accomplished with fewer
sorties by the TCT model.
Utilizing the ability to focus attacks, retask ISR assets, and support missions
with continuous ISR support the TCT model provided reductions in friendly kills
along with higher mission effectiveness. More important is illuminating the impact of
modeling the activities provided in the architecture. If the architecture is represented
without or misrepresents these activities significant impacts on the outcome of the
war would not have been realized. This give credence to utilizing architectures as
source documentation for M & S.
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5.3

Limitations with Architecture
The original AOC architecture provided an OV-5 product, but did not provide

an OV-6 product. The OV-5 provided enough information to be aware of what
information flows in and out of an activity, but no rules or sequencing of rules for
these activities are available without an OV-6 product. The solution was the TCT
”key-thread”, a detailed subset of the AOCs activities sharing the same information
in its creation. The TCT architecture provided an OV-6, operational rules model,
allowing sequence of events and rules to be modeled. However, this transfer of data
was not without its problems.
The IDEF3 format of the OV-6 defines decision points and junctions quite
well, but generally lacked information on entry/exit conditions for processes and
thresholds for decisions. For example Figure 3.10 begins with a decision to be made
if significant movement in the target is detected. No threshold on this movement is
defined in order to make a decision. This is due to the decision being qualitative in
nature, and is left to the analyst to set proper criteria based on the scenario modeled.
With this flexibility lies the potential for inconsistent modeling of the activity.
Each activity is completed by a collection of systems. In order to model overall
system performance we require performance parameters for each system involved in
the activities. We are interested in some time delay for each individual system
to complete its job and to accumulate these values to yield some overall system
performance. SEAS is receptive to this as we can add delays in the orders. Any time
an agent cycles through an IF loop or calls a function we can add the delay. Again
the current version of the AOC architecture does not provide an SV-7 product which
would contain this desired information.
Also, from the architecture provided we are not able to completely represent
the communications network. The OV-3 product provided us with the information
needed to be exchanged between nodes (nodes being represented by agents in SEAS).
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The OV-3 also defines through which of the nodes’ activities the information exits
and enters. The SV-2 informs us of the systems to be used in these exchanges.
However, we are not given sufficient information to discern which systems are to
transmit which types of information. In effect we can not effectively identify bottlenecks or jamming effectiveness. For example, we can not correctly identify the
impact of only UHF jamming if all information between two nodes is degraded due
to the aggregation of the communication channels between nodes.

5.4

Recommendations for SEAS Improvement
In the effort to make SEAS more receptive and the information more consistent

from architecture products, some suggestions are made. In this research building
and verifying the communications network in SEAS became difficult. It is clear
from the SEAS help where and how to input the communication equipment in the
warfile. Establishing a link between two agents requires both agents to own the same
communication equipment. However, in a complicated network it becomes difficult
to identify when all agents have been linked correctly. To aid us in this study
the network graphs seen in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 were used. After the graphs were
established from the architecture data, we began the manual process of matching the
links, modes, and message types to the warfile. We suggest an GUI interface to SEAS
where agents can be placed on a pallet. Once agents are placed they can be linked
by coded communication arrows thus creating a picture much like the one created
in the figures. The information can be then be saved to the warfile automatically.
This would reduce the analysts time to represent the network in SEAS, and provide
a first step in verifying the transfer.
Next, in the case of modeling the TCT activities we identified a need for more
flexible assignments of probabilities in SEAS. In Activity 7, Validation of Target, (in
the case of a first strike), is left to the P I d. If the detecting sensor provides a P I d
high enough the F15 squadron may release an F15 to fly to the target. However,
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for the weapon to engage the target a P Id Commit threshold must be met. The
SEAS help and user briefs do not define how these two probabilities are related.
In simple experiments completed in this research it is concluded that a P I d from
a single sensor must be greater than the P Id Commit for the weapon. Additional
sensor P I ds are not accumulated to create a higher P I d. There may be cases
where multiple sensor information, or a long dwell time on the target warrant a
better perception of the target thus a higher P I d. Compensation for these cases
along with some clarification of these probabilities in SEAS is recommended.
Finally, it has been mentioned that the vertical slice aggregation technique
allow us to capture C4ISR effects by the ability to track the sensor to shooter chain
of events. The standard SEAS killer victim scoreboard output file makes it quite
easy to define who an agent is killed by, but not so clear as to what sensor was
responsible for the sighting resulting in the kill. All sensor detections are available
in the communications output file, but deciphering the chain of events from sensor
detection to kill is difficult.

5.5

Future Research
The AOC agent in this case study was modeled in a very simplistic manner.

The fidelity at which the AOC can be modeled is dependent upon the experience of
the SEAS analyst. In 2001 the Rand Corp. sought to improve the C4ISR capabilities
in SEAS [24]. In this study the AOC is detailed and well represented, but created
from out of date information. Also, the study utilized a previous version of SEAS.
However, the level of effort and detail in this study should be the focus of future
modeling of the AOC.
Due to the limitations of the provided architecture we were unable to assess the
role of the SV-7 information. It was assumed this data would allow us to build the
communication network to a level of detail needed to asses jamming and bottleneck
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studies. By repeating this case study we could validate the role of this information.
An objective of this study was to minimize analyst intervention and time in the
transfer of data from an architecture to a combat model. Follow on research can
focus on a more automated process for the information transfer of data products
that proved to have a valid place in the warfile. Both the System Engineer and
SEAS Analyst recommend future undertakings include a computer programmer as
the automation would require manipulating report generation scripts into VBA or
C+ code. Finally, analysis completed in SEAS may provide recommended changes
to the modeled C4ISR system. In the automation of data transfer we recommend
incorporating the flexibility of a transition from SEAS, or another combat model in
general back to architectures.
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Appendix A. List of Acronyms
ABCM

Agent Based Combat Model

AFDD

Air Force Doctrine Document

AFSAT

Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit

AOC

Aerospace Operations Center

ATO

Air Tasking Order

AV

All View

BDA

Battle Damage Assessment

C4ISR

Command Control

CAOC

Combined Aerospace Operations Center

CAS

Complex Adaptive System

ConOps

Concept of Operations

DMSO

Defense Modeling and Simulation Office

DoD

Department of Defense

DODAF Department of Defense Architectural Framework
EBO

Effects Based Operations

FEBA

Forward Edge of the Battle Area

ICOM

inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms

IDEFØ

method designed to model decisions, actions, and

IDEF3

Process Flow and Object State Description Capture Method

IID

Independent and Identically Distributed

IS

Information Superiority

JIPTL

Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

MOE

Measure of Effectiveness

MUA

Military Utility Analysis

OODA

Observe Orient Decide Act

OV

Operational View
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Pd

Probability of Detection

Pk

Probability of Kill

ROC

Receiver Operating Characteristic

ROE

Rules of Engagement

SA

Surface to Air

SAM

Surface-to-Air Missile

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SEAS

System Evaluation Analysis Simulation

SMC/TD Space and Missile Center Transformations Directorate
SOF

Special Operations Force

SV

System View

TBMCS

Theater Battle Management Core System

TCT

Time Critical Target

TPL

Tactical Programming Language

TPW

Target Planning Worksheet

TTP

Tactics Techniques and Procedures

TV

Technical View

USAFE

United States Air Forces Europe
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